FAA Shifts Focus to Pilot Manual Handling Skills

John found this article from the Aeronautical Society back in August, and it immediately resonated with him. Having started his commercial flying career in the ‘70s, manual flying was the default and over the ensuing years, he lamented the increasing automation in the flight deck. He was even reprimanded a couple of times for manual flying in later years.

We sought permission to reprint the article but received nothing more than deafening silence, so we publish under the concept of implied consent. I’ve included a link to the the original article at the bottom of the page.

After increasing evidence of a decline in manual handling skills in airline pilots, the US FAA has now recommended that airlines should allow pilots to hand-fly during normal operations whenever possible. Captains JOHN LEAHY FRAeS and ALEX FISHER provide the background to this ground-breaking shift.

It may not come too soon. Coincidentally, as this piece was being put together, there have been at least two reported (and yet to be fully investigated) major near-misses recorded in commercial aviation in the space of the past few weeks.

In two alleged separate incidents in December and January large widebody aircraft from United Airlines and Qatar Airlines are reported to have come within 800ft of crashing into the water following take-off. Each had the potential for the loss of hundreds of lives.

These incidents may or may not result in public reports but given the publicity surrounding them, it seems a good time to review the whole area of human factors and accident reporting. We make no judgement on those particular cases. However, there was already a concern among many in the aviation industry that the ‘holes’ in the ‘Swiss Cheese’ (James Reason) model are coming into alignment too often – and only this week the FAA launched a safety review in response to recent ‘close calls’ in commercial aviation.

Can some of these incidents be linked to a much-discussed decline in manual handling skills among pilots?

Qatar flight QR161 entered a dive shortly after departing from Doha on 10 January (Flight Radar 24)

An unprecedented shift in view?

Recently the US FAA has voiced what appears to be a complete shift in attitude towards the balance between automation and manual handling of airliners.

The FAA recently published Aviation Circular [AC 120/123] Flight Path Management, in which it has clearly stated the importance of pilots having the skills to fly the plane when the automation fails. To paraphrase the document it concludes that manual flying skills are paramount for flight safety, that automation requires more training, not less, and that it is not a binary choice between manual and automated flight. Both are essential components with different but complementary skill sets needed.

The FAA went on to state something truly ground-breaking; pilots should hone these manual skills during revenue operations. It suggests and recommends hand flying for most of a flight, in the right conditions. What is ground-breaking about honing one’s skills? Those of us who cut our teeth in the 70s-90s period would not find this out of the ordinary. – that is how it was then. A newer breed of pilot may find this quite unnerving. If you are a Training Manager at an airline, the Circular may not sit well with your current strategy. You may well be on a path totally at variance with the FAA Circular.

Two years ago I helped to produce an article for AEROSPACE on the topic of “Skill Deficit/ Skill Decay”. Captain Alex Fisher did much of the data research (here and here) and its primary argument was that the quality and duration of pilot training could be on an unrecoverable downward spiral.

The rationale was that too many recent accidents, fatal hull losses and Loss of Control (LOC-I) events had a lack of Instrument Flying (IF) ability as a factor. We were also concerned that numerous official final accident reports often failed to allocate cause to what were human failings. They often cite such effects as startle, surprise and illusions as the causes of the event. These effects do exist, but well-trained instrument-rated IFR pilots are trained to overcome them, recover their ability to think and recover the aircraft.

Another trend identified in the reports was the employment by some carriers of pilots with a history of poor flying ability. Many seem to habitually fail and need to repeat annual checks or underperform in other ways, yet remain employed up to the time of the final fatal crash.

Manual flying

Manual flying skills are those where the pilot can manage safe flight without the use of any automation. IF skills relate to the ability to control the aircraft manually using only standard flight instruments. This relies on extensive training. Such pilots are trained to disregard confusing cues such as G-forces and other sensory illusions. Combined, these binary skills are the foundation stone of all commercial pilot training and have been for decades. Note the words “have been.” Are these skills at the forefront of contemporary training courses?

Captain Fisher has spent years documenting the reasons why more than 20 of the world’s most recent air crashes have been the direct result, at least in part, of the lack of these skills. Another factor not addressed in some accident investigations was the lack of understanding of systems design on aircraft and in particular the pitch trim system on the Boeing 737. This is unsurprising since we now know that this complex topic has barely been touched upon during Type Rating courses in recent years. It was recently brought back with great emphasis by Boeing during ‘Return to Service’ training after the MAX crashes. Where was this information hiding in the meantime? Why was this knowledge not centre-stage in pilot training courses?

Poor training

During our initial studies, we included the two 737 Max crashes among those attributable in part to poor training. All readers will know that as time went by, this viewpoint was firmly rejected by world opinion which was informed by US Congressional inquiries, Boeing’s admissions of culpability, a tidal wave of revulsion and even a Netflix full-length movie Boeing, the Downfall

To mention, even softly, that the pilots of those two aircraft were in any way deficient due to their training became unspeakable. Some experts we spoke to, felt that even if our views were correct, and many did, it was a lost cause and it was time to move on. So we removed the MAX crashes from our list of human factor events. However, things did not end there.

Some of us who are members of the Flight Ops Group (not all) held fast to our belief that to wholly blame Boeing for the twin crashes would have ignored the possibility that poor training was a major factor. A factor leading to poor performance during non-normal operations. Fixing MCAS was in our view only a band-aid on a much larger and more intractable malaise.

The purpose of all air-accident investigations is to find the true cause(s) to avoid repetition. We felt that the true cause had not been identified in too many cases. When the true cause was exposed, sometimes no recommendations are made and when they are, it is common that nothing tangible is done.

Despite high-level approaches, the group held little hope that the situation would improve. However, with the FAA now publishing its Flight Path Management project paper things do seem to be changing.

AC 120/123 does not have the teeth to demand change, but does heavily endorses change. Flight Managers, CEOs and their financial advisors may need to make decisions which either accept or reject the FAA view. (Winterseitler/Pixabay)

Endorsing change

It may seem obvious to those not familiar with airline operations that pilots need to be well-trained and practice their hard-won skills all the time. However, in practice, many airlines began discouraging manual flying, except in certain defined conditions, some years ago. As one Flight Manager at a major carrier explained: “It is because they [pilots] make all the mistakes when they take out the autopilot, so why would we risk it…..?”

Of course, one could answer by pointing out that it is much better to ensure flying manually on instruments is well within their skill set. Train pilots better and allow them to utilise these skills frequently. Training is expensive and we know that CFOs require compelling “evidence” to increase expenditure. That evidence has now, we feel, been made public.

We now have AC 120/123 which, while it does not have the teeth to demand change, heavily endorses change. Flight Managers, CEOs and their financial advisors may need to make decisions which either accept or reject the FAA view.

This is a view from the top – from the world’s leading regulator – and if carriers ignore it and suffer a major accident attributable to poor training it soon becomes extremely relevant, very litigious and rather expensive. Safety is a corporate responsibility – not just that of the Chief Pilot or Training Manager.

*The US NTSB and French BEA have challenged the Final State Report on the Ethiopian 737 MAX crash in April 2019. (Boeing)*

Challenging the findings of State Reports

Two recent reports by International Safety Investigation bodies, take issue with some of the findings of the Final State Report on the Ethiopian 737 MAX crash in April 2019. To challenge a report in this way is so rare as to be virtually unprecedented in aviation history. Investigation teams don’t argue in public, at least not until now.

These two remarkable reports, one by the US NTSB and the other by the French BEA into the Ethiopian report, support what our paper of two years ago focussed on; manual flying training deficit.

To be clear on this point, we use the word ‘training’ to avoid any suggestion that the pilots were to blame in any way. Pilots fly the way they are trained, which is why we refer to a ‘training deficit.”

An extract from the NTSB report of 27 December as reported in a leading journal states: “We agree that the un-commanded nose-down inputs from the airplane’s MCAS system should be part of the probable cause for this accident. However, the draft probable cause indicates that the MCAS alone caused the airplane to be ‘unrecoverable,’ and we believe that the probable cause also needs to acknowledge that appropriate crew management of the event, per the procedures that existed at the time, would have allowed the crew to recover the airplane even when faced with the un-commanded nose-down inputs.”

The NTSB proposed that the probable cause in the final report “would include the following causal factors to fully reflect the circumstances of this accident: 1) un-commanded airplane-nose-down inputs from the MCAS due to erroneous AOA values and 2) the flight crew’s inadequate use of manual electric trim and management of thrust to maintain airplane control.”

Later on, it adds that the final report fails to properly address how flight crew performance played a critical role in the accident sequence. “However, a discussion of the accident flight crew’s performance (including CRM) was not sufficiently developed in the EAIB draft report, which continues to focus heavily on system design issues.”

“The EAIB draft report incorrectly states (in several locations) that the MCAS made control of the airplane “impossible” but neglects to state that, if the crew had manually reduced thrust and appropriately used the manual electric trim, the airplane would have remained controllable despite un-commanded MCAS input.”

The report says above: …..” the procedures that existed at the time would have allowed the crew to recover the airplane even when faced with the un-commanded nose-down trim...”

There is no need to speculate about whether or not that 737 Max aeroplane “would have been” controllable. The day before the fatal Lionair crash, the same aeroplane (with a different crew) experienced the same fault sequence. They followed most of the procedures available at the time well enough to continue flying safely from Bali to Jakarta. The event was demonstrably controllable. Rarely in aviation do we have two identical serious events a day apart with totally different outcomes; one safe, the other fatal.

*If these official reports are credible then we have finally broken the omertà and taboo of suggesting that very often our pilots could, given better training, have saved the day. (Gerhard/Pixabay)*

Breaking the taboo

It is now two years since our AEROSPACE report. In that report, we suggested that whenever an aircraft crashes we, as an industry, need to pay attention to the possibility that poor pilot handling skills may have been a factor. Now we have three reports in short succession – from the very top of our industry - addressing the matter of pilot training. In the case of AC 120/123, it goes against the current trend of shorter training with less content, lower costs, more efficiency, smarter automation and using Artificial Intelligence to make all of this possible.

There is no escaping the fact that if these official reports are credible, and looking at their provenance one would have to be brave to say otherwise, then we have finally broken the omertà and taboo of suggesting that very often our pilots could, given better training, have saved the day.

This link details more than 20 such historical events. We can now add back the two 737 MAX crashes which up to now were felt to be too controversial to include. And, as if proof were needed, these new severe incidents in as many weeks have come far too close to disaster, all at well-known airlines.

*Let us not be afraid to look closely at the human factors that contribute to air accidents. (ATR/Pierre Barthe)*

In summary

It is our view that the Circular from the FAA on the importance of manual flying skills has arrived when the industry is at a crossroads – with these accident near-misses in such a short period illustrating what could be a highly dangerous trend.

Suggestions that pilot training is under stress tended to be regarded as alarmist and misinformed by some. That commentary tends to come from those who have to pay for such training, and less so from neutral observers. We see in some recent crashes and incidents evidence of poor training. That said, many aviation schools (ATOs) and airlines train well. This proves the point that it can be achieved within a realistic budget. The adage “If you think training is expensive, try having an accident,” always comes to the fore.

Let us not be afraid to look closely at the human factors that contribute to air accidents.

It is not that these issues are being ignored; several bodies are looking at these matters from various overlapping angles. Therefore a question must be asked; how do bodies like the ICAO working groups, the FAA Aviation Circular on flightpath management, the Committee on Emerging Trends in Aviation Safety and many more learned bodies shape the industry? How do their views integrate with, for example, the ECAC/ICAO position paper on reduced crew operations, known as SPOs or eMCOs? The answer might be that they do not integrate that well and produce excellent reports which do not bring about change and are easy to ignore among all the noise.

But, now that a seminal, clear, simple-to-read document has been issued by perhaps the leading authority in world aviation, the FAA, it is surely a wake-up call. Action is surely needed by airlines to enhance their training where needed, to take into account the multiple recommendations in that report.

References

https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_120-123.pdf

And here’s the link to the original article

https://www.aerosociety.com/news/faa-shifts-focus-to-pilot-manual-handling-skills/